Maybeth Farr Reimann and Paul E. Reimann et al v. W. B. Richards, Jr., et al : Brief of Respondent, Utah State Engineer by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1961
Maybeth Farr Reimann and Paul E. Reimann et al v.
W. B. Richards, Jr., et al : Brief of Respondent, Utah
State Engineer
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Dallin W. Jensen; Richard H. Boyle; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Reimann v. Richards, No. 9340 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3798
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MAYBETH FARR REIMANN 
and PAUL E. REIMANN, 
Plaintiffs, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants, 
r&,+<>'f!:li!' 
vs. ~~ 
W. B. RICHARDS, JR., A. Z. ;~~ 
RICHARDS, A. Z. RICHARDS as1 
"agent for applicants in 
\LED 
-i 1 0 1961 
tnPf~~c~i~~e ~~· ~; ~~ 1 ~n°g~n~!~ --------a~~; --$;;;-.:;~~:~ -c~~1:~--u-t~h---, 
of Utah"; and J. ROY FREE, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents. 
Civil Nos. 107,485; 107,486 and 112,261 
A. Z. RICHARDS, A. Z. RICHARDS 
as agent for Applicants in Applica-
tion No. A-1810 on file in the office 
of the State Engineer of Utah; and 
W. B. RICHARDS, JR., 
Plaintiffs, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents. 
vs. 
PAULE REIMANN, MAYBETH 
FARR REIMANN, his wife, GLEN 
E. YOUNG and WAYNE D. 
CRIDDLE, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants. 
Civil No. 112,596 
Case No. 9340 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
DALLIN W. JENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
RICHARD R. BOYLE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Utah State Engineer 
HOUSE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ------------------------------------------ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ------------------------------------------- 5 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
FINDING THAT THE WATER USERS IN 
MOUNTAIR CANYON COULD ONLY BENEFI-
CIALLY USE A MAXIMUM OF 650 GALLONS 
A DAY PER HOME FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES __ 5 
CON CL US I 0 N ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 
CASES CITED 
Brian v. Fremont Irrigation Co., 112 U. 220, 186 P.2d 558 6 
In Re Water Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage 
A rea, 10 U. 2d 77, 348 P .2d 679______________________________________ 6 
Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 U. 243, 289 
p. 116 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 U. 50, 40 P.2d 755 ________________________ 8 
STATUTES CITED 
73-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953____________________________________ 5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MAYBETH FARR REIMANN 
and PAUL E. REIMANN, 
Plaintiffs, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants, 
vs. 
W. B. RICHARDS, JR., A. Z. 
RICHARDS, A. Z. RICHARDS as 
"agent for applicants in 
Application No. A-1810 on file 
in the Office of State Engineer 
of Utah"; and J. ROY FREE, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents. 
Civil Nos. 107,485; 107,486 and 112,261 
A. Z. RICHARDS, A. Z. RICHARDS 
as agent for Applicants in Applica-
tion No. A-1810 on file in the office 
of the State Engineer of Utah; and 
W. B. RICHARDS, JR., 
Plaintiffs, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents. 
vs. 
PAULE REIMANN, MAYBETH 
FARR REIMANN, his wife, GLEN 
E. YOUNG and WAYNE D. 
CRIDDLE, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants. 
Civil No. 112,596 
Case No. 9340 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The State Engineer of the State of Utah, hereinafter 
referred to as the "State", is a respondent herein, and 
believes it advisable to set out the facts which relate to the 
actions of the State in this controversy, to clarify the 
State's position. 
It should be noted at the outset that this appeal 
involves not only action taken by the State, but also 
matters strictly between the parties and that the two 
were joined in one lawsuit. As to those matters between 
the private parties to this litigation, the State has no dfrect 
interest and, therefore, has no comment on the Court's 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The first matter involving the State to which a brief 
statement will be made is the action taken by the State 
upon the eight applications in question and the subse-
quent rulings of the trial court on these applications. It 
was agreed at the pretrial conference by all of the parties 
that the court should try the State's actions on all eight 
of these applications in this one trial and make one set 
of findings and one decree covering the court's decision 
on the eight applications. (R. 159). 
The State approved Applications Nos. 27404 and 27410 
filed by Paul E. Reimann and the trial court affirmed this 
approval (R. 119). The State Engineer had indicated to 
applicant by letter dated April 24, 1957, that Applications 
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Nos. 27770 and 28106, filed by Paul E. Reimann, were 
going to be approved and it was agreed at the pretrial by 
the parties that this letter should be amended to include 
Application No. 28555 (R. 157), and it was stipulated that 
the action by the State on these three applications should 
be tried as a part of this lawsuit (R. 158). The trial court 
affirmed the approval of these three latter applications in 
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment (R. 118 and 119). 
The State rejected Application No. 24531 filed by May-
beth Farr Reimann, and Applications No. 24532 and 27987 
filed by Paul E. Reimann; the trial court upheld the re-
jection of Application No. 27987 but reversed the decision 
of the State Engineer as to Applications Nos. 24531 and 
24532 and ordered these two applications approved. 
The State does not appeal the court's order approving 
Applications Nos. 24531 and 24532 because as indicated in 
the State's memorandum decision (R. 18, 19 and 20) re-
jecting these applications, they involved questions of non-
use, adverse use and the effect of a prior court decree 
which were problems which could ultimately be decided 
only by the court. The State, therefore, left the parties 
status quo to enable the court to properly determine these 
n1atters. A similar decision was rendered by the State in 
the case of Application No. 27987. 
The approval by the State of the other applications 
in the group was based on the theory that these were 
developed spring areas and, therefore, applicants were not 
taking water tributary to Mountair Creek. This was one 
of the basic issues at trial (R. 160-161) and goes ultimately 
to the question of whether there is in fact unappropriated 
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water in Mountair Canyon. It was the State's intention 
to leave this matter to the parties (R. 185). However, the 
State did, at the request of the court, (R. 907), make addi-
tional studies in the area during the trial of this case, 
which led to the State's concern as to how the determina-
tion of the·· rights of these parties might affect or inter-
fere with lower rights in the drainage basin below Mount-
air Canyon. 
It was realized that the problem of lower users was 
not then before the court, and would only be brought 
before the court at a later date, within the context of a 
general adjudication of all the water in this area. However, 
the State believes the court has judiciously provided for 
such later adjudication in paragraphs 10 and 11 (R. 119) 
of the judgment and decree wherein it is provided that 
the applications and the court's decision thereon are sub-
ject to all existing vested water rights in this source and 
that the judgment is without prejudice to any third party 
rights which may be determined in any future general 
adjudication proceedings in this drainage area. 
Under these circumstances the State believes its 
interests as to the eight applications in question are fully 
protected by the trial court and will, therefore, leave any 
further comment on these rights to the parties. 
However, the State believes it is in a somewhat 
different position in regards to the determination by the 
court that a flow of 650 gallons per day is adequate to 
supply one home in this area. The courts finding was 
based on information supplied by the State in their study 
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noted above, (R. 907). The State presented testimony at 
trial to sustain the figure of 650 gallons per day per 
cabin and the court adopted this figure as the reasonable 
beneficial requirements of one home in this canyon. The 
State will confine its argument to this single point. 
STATEMENTS OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FIND-
ING THAT THE WATER USERS IN MOUNT AIR 
CANYON COULD ONLY BENEFICIALLY USE A 
MAXIMUM OF 650 GALLONS A DAY PER HOME 
FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FIND-
ING THAT THE WATER USERS IN MOUNT AIR 
CANYON COULD ONLY BENEFICIALLY USE A 
MAXIMUM OF 650 GALLONS A DAY PER HOME 
FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES. 
It is uncontested that the present use of water in 
Mountair Canyon is a beneficial one, the only question to 
be resolved by this court is the extent of such beneficial 
use. It is the contention of the State that the maximum 
possible beneficial use of water for any one home is 650 
gallons per day. 
That the beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure 
and the limit of the right to use water is one of the most 
fundamental principles of water law in the State of Utah, 
Section 73-1-3, U.C.A. 1953. 
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It is also the public policy in this state that conserva-
tion of water is of utmost importance to the public wel-
fare, Brian v. Fremont Irrigation Co., 112 U. 220, 186 P. 
2d 558, and, further, that it is against the public policy of 
this state to permit the waste of water, Little Cottonwood 
Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 U. 243, 289 P. 116. 
When an individual appropriates water in Utah, even 
if he has prior rights, he must use it in a reasonable man-
ner and no more can be appropriated for a purpose than 
will reasonably meet the need. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated in In Re Water Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage 
A.rea, 10 U. 2d 77, 348 P. 2d 679, the following on the extent 
of a prior appropriator's rights: 
"* * * that a prior appropriator does not have an 
unlimited right to the use of water, but is subject 
to a reasonable limitation of his right for the bene-
fit of junior appropriators. That it is necessary 
and proper to limit prior appropriators to the vol-
ume of water reasonably required to raise crops 
under reasonably efficient methods of applying 
water to the land. That beneficial use is the basis 
and the measure and the limit to the use of water 
and water used in excess of the amount reasonably 
necessary to produce crops is not beneficially used." 
Although this case involved waters being applied for 
irrigation purposes, the same principle is involved in the 
instant case, and the State submits the finding of 650 gal-
lons per day per home was correct and proper as the 
amount reasonably required to satisfy a home use. 
It was the testimony of Hubert C. Lambert, Deputy 
State Engineer, that the State Engineer's Office had made 
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extensive studies on the amount of water needed for a 
family for domestic purposes (R. 1055). He stated that 
based on such studies his office had arrived at the figure 
of 650 gallons of water per day per family and that this 
took into account all of the inside household needs of the 
family, but did not take into consideration the water 
requirements of a lawn (R. 1056). He further testified 
that the figure of 650 gallons is the amount needed by the 
family to carry on normal activities whether consumed 
or used for non-consumptive purposes (R. 1057). 
The State Engineer's Office did not consider the types 
of diversions in reaching its determination of household 
requirements of these homes inasmuch as its investigation 
was limited to a study of the beneficial use requirements 
of normal household use (R. 1058-1059). 
Appellants express concern, on page 17 of their brief, 
at the State's failure to consider the nature of the diversion 
works and the absence of storage facilities for each of the 
cabins in its study. They also point out that other wit-
nesses gave testimony that more water would be needed 
than 650 gallons and that this would be necessary at the 
peak flow rate of use. The citations to the record noted 
by appellants disclose no more than the opinion of certain 
witnesses which are not based upon any actual measure-
ments by the witness as to beneficial use requirements. 
The court had before it the opinion of appellant and 
of the State and it simply chose to take the State's opinion 
as the more sound. Appellants contend that they are 
entitled to a certain flow during the peak periods of the 
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day, and we agree that an appropriator is entitled to a 
flow of water in accordance with his appropriation, so long 
as that flow is reasonable and not excessive or wasteful. 
While flow must be determined in defining a water right 
in its entirety, and in any domestic system storage may 
be desirable to attain a constant flow, still the water user 
can only beneficially use a certain amount of water not-
withstanding the rate at which the water is diverted. 
The State feels that this flow is a distinct and seperate 
problem and does not bear on a determination of the total 
beneficial use requirements for any given use of water 
once delivered. It is agreed that the use of water in a 
home is usually concentrated into peak use periods during 
the day; however, this fact is not peculiar to Mountair 
Canyon but is the universal rule in any domestic water 
system. 
However, to take the peak uses of the water and times 
that by the number of hours in the day would be a com-
pletely erroneous method of arriving at the total bene-
ficial use requirements of a home since there are great 
portions of the day and night when use in the home is 
relatively small and some periods wliere they may be no 
use at all. The flow is independent from how much water 
the home can beneficially use in one day once that water 
is delivered. We realize that in most homes the amount 
of water will probably vary somewhat from day to day, 
depending on what household activities are taking place. 
However, the figure submitted by the State Engineer's 
Office is calculated not on the average need but on that 
amount sufficient to satisfy any reasonable household 
need. (R. 1056). 
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One of the essentials of a valid appropriation of water 
is that a definite quantity of water be applied to a useful 
and beneficial purpose. Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 U. 50, 
40 P. 2d 755. We contend that the definite quantity here 
appropriated could not exceed 650 gallons per day per 
home and still be beneficial. Any excessive award to these 
home owners would prove detrimental to this whole stream 
system, since these individuals would have paper rights 
to more water than they were actually beneficially using, 
and this would have the effect of discouraging further 
development of this water source by other appropriators 
contrary to the public policy of this state. 
CONCLUSION 
The individual water user in the State of Utah can 
only gain a right to the use of water to the extent of his 
beneficial requirements thereof. The trial court had a 
sound basis upon which to make a finding that the bene-
ficial requirements of a home were limited to 650 gallons 
per day. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court in this 
respect should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
DALLIN W. JENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
RICHARD R. BOYLE 
Assistant Attorney General 
RICHARD R. BOYLE 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Utah State Engineer 
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